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I. Introduction
Sometimes a little bit of economics goes a long way in aiding our
understanding of perplexing practices and conventions within the legal
profession. The study of third-party legal opinions is one such occasion.
A third-party legal opinion is simply a legal opinion provided for the
benefit of some third party who is not the client of the lawyers who write the
opinion. Of course, there is no legal requirement that third-party legal opinions
be issued to support particular transactions. The market for such opinions exists
because the issuance of such an opinion makes the transaction worth more to the
third party, and therefore to the client, and hence there are gains from trade
(because the deal is worth more) from organizing a transaction such that the
client's counter-party receives a third-party legal opinion.
Simple economic analysis helps us understand why a market for third-party
legal opinions exists, and it also helps us better understand whether this market
should be regulated, and if so to what extent. Steven Schwarcz's article, The
Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance,1 contains a wealth
of institutional detail and greatly advances our understanding of the nature of
third-party legal opinions in general and their role in structured finance in
particular. Professor Schwarcz's excellent article reflects a great depth of
experience and learning as well as an appreciation for the practical environment
in which the law operates. His article will be an important touchstone for
lawyers now and for the foreseeable future.
Third-party opinions often occur in the context of structured finance
transactions. Such opinions frequently are adduced in order to generate guidance
for legal issues that are quite narrow and often specific to a particular transaction.
Analysis of the issues generated by third-party legal opinions is, by necessity,
complicated stuff, and not for those adverse to legalese and other sorts of
technical jargon, such as accounting-speak and finance-speak.
For example, from Professor Schwarcz we learn that
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true sale and nonconsolidation opinions-the legal opinions most
commonly associated with off-balance-sheet financing-are
frequently issued by most major law firms. These opinions
(hereinafter "structured-finance opinions") address only bankruptcy
law issues and make no accounting analysis. Indeed, their primary as
well as historical purpose is to assure investors and rating agencies
that the structure of the SPV transaction is "bankruptcy remote."
Furthermore, these opinions typically are.., and, for purposes of the
following discussion, initially will be assumed to be ... technically
correct as to the legal matters they purport to cover.2
II. The Market for Third-Party Legal Opinions
As suggested above, it seems safe to conclude that the reason we
observe third-party legal opinions is because they are efficient. They are
efficient because, even though they are costly to the clients who pay for
them, they increase the overall value of the transactions to which they pertain
by some amount greater than the cost to the parties.
Of course, the market response to the demand for a legal opinion does
not automatically generate a third-party legal opinion. There must be some
reason why the third party prefers to have a legal opinion generated by its
counter-parties' lawyer, rather than by its own lawyer. And here it is
interesting to note that sometimes the third parties receiving legal opinions
do, in fact, have their own counsel, and the lawyers issuing a third-party
opinion "often have to negotiate their opinion with counsel for the opinion
recipient.",3 This, of course, brings into sharp focus the question of why third
parties want a legal opinion from their counter-parties' lawyers rather than
from their own attorneys.
It seems to me that the answer to this question is simple. Clients direct
their lawyers to generate legal opinions for third parties such as investors or
credit providers in a wide range of business and financial undertakings
because their lawyers can do so more efficiently than the lawyers for the third
parties. This is because the lawyers generating the opinions enjoy certain
economies of scope when they combine the legal work they do for their
clients with the legal work that they do for the third parties. The
performance of due diligence for the recipient is a prime example of this
phenomenon: the issuance of a third-party legal opinion obviates the need for
the recipient's lawyers to duplicate such work already done by a client's
lawyers.4
2. Id. at 5 (internal citations omitted).
3. Id. at 25; see also Leslie L. Gardner, Note, Attorney Liability to Third Parties for Corporate
Opinion Letters, 64 B.U. L. REv. 415, 419 n.34 (1984) (stating that "the general content of the legal
opinion is usually negotiated prior to its issuance").
4. See Schwarcz, supra note t, at 10-11 n.55 (explaining that third-party legal opinions can be
used by their recipients to establish due diligence).
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This efficiency explanation for third-party legal opinions conflicts with
some of Professor Schwarcz's arguments, but not with others. Professor
Schwarcz makes what appear to me to be two inconsistent arguments related
to this point. On the one hand, Professor Schwarcz argues that the existence
of "information asymmetries" explains the market for third-party legal
opinions. 5 On this view, the market for third-party legal opinions exists
because they "operate to effectively reduce information asymmetry between
parties to a transaction. '' 6 At another point in his article, Professor Schwarcz
suggests that no such information asymmetry actually exists. Specifically,
Professor Schwarcz observes that "recipients of such opinions often have the
same factual information that opining counsel has.",7 This assertion is flatly
inconsistent with Professor Schwarcz's informational asymmetry argument
because there can be no information asymmetry if the two sides already have
the same information.
Professor Schwarcz also argues, incorrectly in my view, that the market
for third-party legal opinions exists even where the parties have the same
information because "opining counsel assesses certain legal consequences of
that information for the opinion recipients. 8  The problem with this
argument is that it does not explain why the opining counsel is better able to
assess "certain legal consequences" of information better (more cheaply or
more reliably) than the recipient's actual counsel. In fact, this assertion
appears quite implausible. Recipient's counsel is likely to have the same
ability to apply the law to facts as opining counsel.
Therefore, among these rival explanations, I am drawn to the efficiency
explanation of third-party opinions. There is a market for third-party legal
opinions because there are economies of scale in doing the original legal
work for a client, and then using that information to generate a legal opinion
for the recipient. It's not that the opining counsel has better analytical
powers or is better able to assess legal consequences of information than
recipient's counsel. Rather, the market is driven by the fact that the costs of
using the client's lawyer are lower than the costs of using the recipient's
lawyer.
My efficiency theory is consistent with and strongly supported by
Professor Schwarcz's interesting observation that third-party legal opinions
are not typically requested on legal issues whose analysis would be
independent of the transaction's fact pattern.9 In other words, third-party
5. See id. at 9-10 (noting that third-party opinions are usually required as a condition precedent
for closing transactions).
6. Id. at 10; see also Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and
Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 312 (1984) (describing lawyers as "transaction cost engineers,"
and describing how legal opinions of all sorts can reduce the costs associated with information
asymmetry between parties).
7. Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 10 n.54.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 10 n.53.
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legal opinions are only used when there are "legal issues whose underlying
facts are transaction-specific."'
0
Thus, I agree with Professor Schwarcz's observation that an information
asymmetry exists between those demanding and those supplying third-party
legal opinions. To the extent that Professor Schwarcz asserts that the parties
have "the same factual information,"" I disagree with his analysis.
Furthermore, it seems to me that the existence of an information asymmetry
is only the start of the economic analysis. For two reasons, the existence of
such an information asymmetry is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition
for the emergence of a market for third-party legal opinions.
The first reason is that, outside of the structured-finance context in
which Professor Schwarcz is writing, we observe many transactions in which
there are information asymmetries without the existence of a third-party legal
opinion. In any simple transaction between a buyer and a seller for the
exchange of assets for cash, there is probably an acute information
asymmetry because the owner of the assets is likely to know a lot more about
those assets than the prospective buyer. As explained in more detail below,
disclosure is the usual way of dealing with this problem. But there are
myriad other ways as well. For example, sellers and buyers can solve (or at
least mitigate) the problems posed by asymmetrical information by using
guarantees, or warranties, or through insurance or other sorts of assurances or
representations that pass from sellers to buyers where asymmetrical
information exists. Third-party legal opinions emerge where such opinions
represent the most efficient way to deal with the asymmetrical information
problem between a law firm's clients and the recipients of such letters. This,
in turn, is likely to be the case where the law firm can use legal analysis
already done to generate the opinion letter.
The second reason why the existence of an information asymmetry is a
necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for the emergence of a market for
third-party legal opinions is that the issuance of a third-party legal opinion is
not the only way to deal with the existence of an information asymmetry.
Simple disclosure is another way. Disclosure of the transaction-specific facts
would eradicate the information asymmetry. So it must be the case that the
preparation of a third-party legal opinion is more efficient than alternative
methods, such as disclosure, for dealing with the information asymmetry. It
is not immediately apparent why this is so, and Professor Schwarcz does not
consider the issue. One likely explanation is that there are economies of
scale between legal work that the law firm issuing the third-party legal
opinion does for its client, and the legal work involved in preparing the third-
party legal opinion. Another plausible explanation of why third-party legal
opinions may be more efficient than simple disclosure is credibility.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 10 n.54.
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Disclosures by the issuer may not be as credible when they are made outside
of the context of an actual opinion letter. A third possibility is that the client
would prefer to keep the information necessary to write the third-party
opinion letter confidential, and the third-party opinion letter serves as a
superior substitute to disclosure because it satisfies the recipient's need for
information without disclosure that the client views as costly. All of these
alternatives are consistent with my efficiency explanation.
With this point clarified, we are prepared to confront the most
interesting part of Professor Schwarcz's article, his arguments about
externalities.
III. Externalities
An externality occurs when private activities have an effect on third
parties who receive no compensation for the effects generated by these
private activities. Pollution creates negative externalities. An agreement
between two people to rob and kill a third person creates a negative
externality, at least for the third person. A contract between a customer and a
supplier presumably creates benefits for the customer and the supplier and
may well impose costs on third parties, such as competitors of the customer
and the supplier. But there is a critical difference between the first two
examples of externalities and the third. In the first two examples, the
externality infringes certain rights of the affected third party: the right to
clean air, the right to life and property. In the third example, by contrast, the
externality is what is known among economists as a mere "pecuniary"
externality: it imposes a cost on a third party but does not interfere with any
legal or moral right that the third party is thought to enjoy. 12 This is because
there is no "right" to be free from the effects of competition.
Professor Schwarcz argues that "the principal basis for governmental
imposition of constraints on structured-finance opinions... appears to be
protection against externalities." 13  Unfortunately, the article does not
distinguish among various types of externalities. This is unfortunate since
every sort of economic activity-from innovation, to commercial contracts
and agreements, to transactions in markets-generates an externality, when
"externality" is defined as having an effect on third parties. Professor
Schwarcz attempts to finesse this problem by asserting that there exists a
distinction between "lawful externalities" and "unlawful extemalities."' 14 But
this reasoning is circular: if a lawful externality is an externality that has been
made permissible by the government, then the existence of an externality
cannot be used to justify government intervention. In other words, if lawful
12. For a discussion of externalities, including the difference between true externalities and
mere pecuniary externalities, particularly in the context of takeovers, see David D. Haddock et al.,
Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 VA. L. REv. 701 (1987).
13. Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 23.
14. Id. at 26.
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externalities are permissible, then any conduct permitted by law, however
detrimental to the economy, is permissible, while if unlawful externalities are
impermissible, then any conduct not permitted by law, however beneficial to
the economy, is impermissible. Of course, if this is the test, then there is no
need to introduce the concept of externalities into the discussion since the
real issue has nothing to do with externalities but rather with whether the
conduct is legal or not.
This is not to say that I necessarily disagree with Professor Schwarcz's
policy conclusions. In fact, I think his observations may well be sound. I
mean only to say that his analysis is not particularly helpful in forming
opinions about the nature and limits of third-party legal opinions.
For one thing, it is not entirely clear what sort of externalities Professor
Schwarcz refers to because sometimes he appears to be talking about
externalities created by a lawyer's third-party legal opinion, while at other
times he appears to be talking about externalities associated with the
underlying transactions themselves. For example, Professor Schwarcz talks
about "externalities caused by structured-finance opinions" that "affect the
public,"' 15 while then in the very next paragraph he observes that "[a]ll
transactions, including structured-finance transactions, create externalities.' 6
A more serious concern regarding Professor Schwarcz's externality
argument is his idea that third-party legal opinions should not "create
externalities that society defines as unlawful."' 17 In fact, externalities have
nothing to do with his argument. Rather, Professor Schwarcz argues that,
regardless of the presence or absence of externalities, a transaction and its
concomitant third-party legal opinion can go forward as long as a transaction
is technically legal. After all, as Professor Schwarcz observes, "[I]f lawyers
were constrained from providing opinions to effectuate bargained-for lawful
business transactions that nonetheless may cause externalities, they would be
forced to substitute their judgment about externalities for that of their
clients."' 18 This, in turn, would be bad because "clients generally have more
and better information about the consequences of a transaction, other than the
transaction's legality.'
' 9
This is not quite a complete argument for two reasons. First, just
because clients generally have more and better information about the
consequences of transactions, that does not mean that such clients have more
and better incentives to refrain from going forward with transactions whose
social harms outweigh their social benefits. In fact, clients are likely to have
very perverse incentives since it is the clients who receive all of the benefits
from any negative externalities they impose on others.
15. Id at 26.
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Thus, the option of having clients decide the externality issue, as
Professor Schwarcz suggests, is not very satisfying. Alternatively, it may be
the case that Professor Schwarcz is saying that the legislature is, in effect,
making this decision, since it is Congress and, via delegation from Congress,
federal administrative agencies like the SEC that are deciding what is legal
and what is not. But if this is the case, then neither lawyers writing third-
party legal opinions nor the companies engaged in the transactions that
require the generation of such opinions should be expected to engage in any
review of the externalities associated with any transaction in which they are
engaged, as distinct from their review of the basic legality of the transaction.
IV. Conclusion
I agree with Professor Schwarcz's assertion that lawyers face
information costs that make them unattractive candidates for serving as
gatekeepers for society regarding the transactions for which they issue third-
party legal opinions. While lawyers are unattractive candidates for the
position of gatekeeper because of the information costs they face, companies
are even more unattractive candidates for this position because they lack the
incentives to serve as gatekeepers.
This in turn raises the thorny question of whether there is any
professional well-situated to serve as gatekeeper for complex structured-
finance transactions. Professor Schwarcz scrupulously avoids this question.
He makes the argument that lawyers should, absent extraordinary
circumstances, be able to examine only the portion of any transaction
relevant to their opinions, at least as long as they have no warning that the
underlying transaction itself is illegal.2°
That may be a fine strategy, in theory, but it's very risky in practice
these days. For example, quite recently, the accounting firm KPMG and a
number of its former professionals have gotten into serious trouble over the
sale of tax shelters. The defendants' argument in these cases is the same as
Professor Schwarcz's. Specifically, the tax shelters sold by KPMG were
devised by KPMG to help wealthy individuals avoid billions of dollars in
taxes while staying within the strict letter of the law. As Robert S. Fink, the
lawyer for one of the eight KPMG partners indicted by the Department of
Justice observed:
[B]y bringing these indictments, the government is attempting to
criminalize the type of tax planning that tax professionals engage in on
a daily basis. If the government wants to put an end to these types of
transactions, the proper response is for Congress to change the law,
21
not to scare professionals away with indictments.
20. Id. at 32-33.
21. Jennifer Bayot, 8 Shelter Experts Indicted, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Aug. 30,
2005, at C1 ("In 2003, a Senate subcommittee report on four KPMG shelters found that people who
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So we are left with the now well-accepted "asymmetry of information"
theory of third-party legal opinions.22 Such opinions are efficient where the
benefits outweigh the costs. The costs are a byproduct of the fact that the
lawyers issuing such opinions face an acute conflict of interest, since these
lawyers' paying clients are negotiating against the parties on whose behalf
the opinion is being offered. The benefits come from the fact that the
lawyers issuing the third-party legal opinion can do so more cheaply than
other lawyers, since they are already involved in the transaction and thus
enjoy economies of scope when performing two sets of legal services
associated with the deal.
A final issue to confront in the area of third-party legal opinions is the
issue of what is special about them. Should there be any difference in the
rights and responsibilities afforded by lawyers to their ordinary, plain-vanilla
clients and the rights and responsibilities that extend to recipients of third-
party legal opinions? I think not. Like any other client, the recipient of a
third-party legal opinion who does not trust or like the opinion generated by
the lawyers hired to issue the opinion has several options, including: (a)
hiring its own professionals to render legal advice; (b) refusing to proceed
with the transaction; or (c) renegotiating the transaction's price or other terms
to offset any perceived increase in risk associated with the opinion. These
options are the same options that counterparties normally have when they are
concerned about the advice they have received in connection with a
transaction they are thinking of pursuing. In other words, what we learn is
that third-party legal opinions are not, in any discernible respect, different
from other sorts of legal opinions, either in terms of the risks and problems
for lawyers, or in terms of the risks and problems for clients and third parties.
The only difference is that there are always third parties involved when third-
party legal opinions are offered, and this is often, but not always, the case
when other sorts of legal advice are rendered.
bought the shelters avoided at least $1.4 billion in taxes from 1996 to 2002."); see also Jonathan D.
Glater, 8 Former Partners of KPMG Are Indicted, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2005, at C 1.
22. See Bryn Vaaler, Bridging the Gap: Legal Opinions as an Introduction to Business
Lawyering, 61 UMIKC L. REV. 23, 38 (1992) (discussing Professor Ronald Gilson's theory of
"transaction cost engineering" and its relation the role of third-party legal opinions in diminishing
information asymmetry between transacting parties).
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